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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Today's complex software is of much value to its creator. Whether that be a company with 
many products, or the only product of a small company. Of much concern is the protection of 
this software, such that it will always retain the functionality which its creators intended, always 
protect the intellectual property embedded in the program, and thwart attempts to make illegal 
copies of the program. There have been several different approaches proposed in an effort to deal 
with such attacks, but most of the commercially available defenses rely on reactive measures. 
Almost anyone will agree that software should be protected, but little is agreed upon as to how 
this should be done. At the root of the problem is the need for a solution that relies on proactive 
measures, which ultimately means modifications to the way software is made. Furthermore, a 
solution that requires no new software design paradigms (from a software engineer's viewpoint) 
and is fully automated is highly desirable. 
1.1 Proactive Solutions 
In order to take a proactive approach, one must be able to either determine that the program 
has been altered, or make any alterations impossible. Tamper-proofing and code obfuscation 
attempt to address these requirements. What is of much interest, as we will see later, is that 
these two approaches can be combined for a robust and tamper-resistant solution. 
In order for a program to detect whether or not it has been altered requires that the program 
check itself every time it is run. Because it must be checked at runtime, the most obvious solution 
is to insert tamper-proofing code into the program itself. 
The other approach is to render a program unintelligible to its adversary through obfuscation. 
The basic premise being, that if you don't know what you are looking at, then it is impossible 
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to intelligently alter the code. One problem that arises from this approach is that it is possible 
to obfuscate a program to such a degree, that even the creator can no longer tell what he/she 
is looking at. This can cause major problems when one must debug software through the use of 
stack dumps, assembly traces, and/or memory inspection. One would argue that the solution 
to this problem would be to debug the code prior to obfuscation, but this may not be possible. 
After a piece of software is obfuscated and deployed, the end user may experience bugs that 
were not seen during testing of the original code. Tracking down problems at this stage may 
become impossible. 
A tamper resistant approach that detects and/or subverts/corrects the tampering actions in 
real time (concurrently with the program execution) is desirable. Ultimately, a technique that 
will protect the software transparently, without the user even knowing such actions are taking 
place, will succeed. 
1.2 What We Are Up Against 
Observation of the historical trends suggest that the attack methods appear to be more 
mature than (lead in time) the security methods. Attacks use many readily available tools which 
allow them to monitor network connections, monitor a program's instructions with debuggers, 
modify an operating system's kernel1, monitor address and memory busses, etc.. It seems 
somewhat ironic that the tools used to help design and implement complex software, are the 
same tools used to attack it. 
Much has been done to thwart network originated attacks, but little has been done to 
thwart hardware and software based attacks on the intellectual property embedded within a 
program. These attacks include modifications to a program to skip crucial checks (such as 
license file/servers), or reverse engineering of a key piece of a program's functionality. 
The anti-tamper techniques in general are designed to detect or sense any type of tampering 
of a program. Once such tampering is detected, one of many possible actions could be taken 
by the anti-tamper part of the software. These actions could include disabling the software, 
10perating systems such as Linux are open source, allowing modification of any part of a program's system 
interface. 
3 
deleting the software, or making the software generate invalid results rendering it useless to the 
tampering adversary. 
1.3 Control Flow Monitoring Using a Two Process Model 
This thesis proposes one such anti-tamper methodology based on constant program moni-
toring. The monitoring process must have some knowledge of the monitored program's meta-
structure and some notion of program semantics with respect to the tamper protected domain. 
This domain happens to be the control flow integrity. We propose that all tampering methods, 
be they data tampering, memory tampering or network traffic tampering, eventually exhibit 
themselves in the control flow corruption. Hence, all types of tampering can be captured even 
if only control flow tampering is incorporated into an anti-tamper system design paradigm. 
With this premise, we propose to use a two-process model for program integrity (one that is 
not tampered) checking. The original program runs as a program process (P-Process), whereas 
a monitoring co-process (M-process) runs concurrently with the sole objective of dynamically 
verifying the control flow of the P-process. 
The original program is compiled into the two process model by a modified Gnu C Compiler 
(gee). The P-process performs periodic control flow integrity checks by communicating its in-
stantiated control flow (since the last check) to the M-process. The M-process has the correct 
control flow of the P-process stored in it. The compiler can statically determine the piecemeal 
control flow information and compile it into a data structure resident in the M-process memory. 
The M-process performs the integrity check on the received control flow segment with respect 
to this data structure. If the check fails, it can take one of the few corrective actions such as 
killing the P-process and/or raising an interrupt. If the check passes, no information need be 
communicated back to the P-process. The frequency of the check primitives is user specifiable 
to control the overhead of the scheme. 
We have implemented this scheme with gee on Linux. We present the performance overhead 
data on a variety of programs (interactive versus CPU intensive) in Chapter 4. The implemen-
tation details are given in Chapter 3.4. 
4 
It is worth noting that the entire monitoring framework was first conceived as an architectural 
paradigm. The processor in such a case would have two computing engines: one for the P-process 
and one for the M-process. Such a two-instruction stream processor can perform these checks 
much more efficiently and stealthily. 
We will show how this approach pro-actively protects a program with no interaction (and 
no knowledge required) from the end user. Furthermore, we will show how this approach is 
highly suitable for user-interaction dominated programs, and configurable for computationally 
intensive programs. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
There exists a wide range of tamper resistance methodologies. The following discusses some 
of the more widely know approaches. The main focus of this paper is on control flow monitoring, 
augmented with some new approaches, which are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
It is also important to keep in mind, that in order to increase the effectiveness of tamper 
resistance, multiple approaches can be combined. One should think carefully about how to 
combine different approaches, and strive to mask the weaknesses of one, with the strengths 
of another. For example, combining control flow monitoring with obfuscation can lead to a 
monitored program that requires significant effort to reverse engineer (NP-Complete)[12]. 
2.1 Watermarking 
Watermarking consists of statically, or dynamically inserting signatures into a program, 
which serve to identify the original owner. Static watermarks never change, and are therefore 
subject to some level of reverse engineering. Dynamic watermarks change with the program 
execution. Watermarks are either extracted from a program's image, or from the program 
execution itself. Watermarking, as mention previously, is a reactive measure. Hence, we will not 
be looking into watermarking as an effective technique. While this performs a valuable function, 
the idea is to avoid the need for this all together by making the program impossible to tamper 
with in the first place. Good representatives of software watermarking methods are [2] and [11]. 
Static watermarks evolved from the area of digital imaging. Watermarks for images have 
been around for quite some time, and are fairly mature. This idea has been used in program 
watermarking in a very simple way. First watermark a small image. Then embed the image 
into the data section of a program. This way, the image can be extracted from the program, 
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and then the watermark from the image. It is rather apparent that such a simplistic approach 
is easily broken using standard binary editing tools. 
Of more interest are the dynamic water marks. For example, and Easter Egg watermark 
is a watermark that is embedded into the functionality of the program. When the program is 
given a particular input set, it performs some action that is immediately visible to the user. A 
typical Easter Egg watermark might display a logo, or force a program into a particular mode. 
For example, the following will turn Microsoft Word97 into a pinball game: 
1. Open a new document 
2. Type the word "Blue" 
3. Highlight the word "Blue" 
4. Using the Format menu select Font 
5. Choose Font Style Bold, Color Blue 
6. Type" " (space) after word "Blue" 
7. Using the Help menu select About 
8. Ctrl-Shift-Left click the Word icon/banner 
9. Use Z for left flipper, M for right flipper, and ESC to exit 
Other dynamic watermarks include execution tracing and data structure analysis, both pro-
ducing no immediate output for the user, but instead relying on monitoring a particular property 
of the program when given special input. Because of the nature of these two watermarks, they 
do not work well with most types of code obfuscation. 
2.2 Obfuscation 
Code obfuscation attempts to make the task of reverse engineering a program daunting and 
time consuming. This is done by transforming the original program into an equivalent program, 
which is much harder to understand, using static analysis. 
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More formally, code obfuscation involves transforming the original program P into a new 
program P' with the same black box functionality. P' should be built such that [2]: 
It maximizes obscurity, i.e., it is far more time consuming to reverse engineer P' 
when compared to P. 
11 It maximizes resilience, i.e., P' is resilient to automated attacks. Either they will 
not work at all, or they will be so time consuming that they will not be practical. 
iii It maximizes stealth properties, i.e., P' should exhibit similar statistical properties, 
when compared to P. 
iv It minimizes cost, i.e., the performance degradation caused by adding obfuscation 
techniques to P' should be minimized. 
Obfuscation techniques involve lexical, control and data transformations. Lexical transfor-
mations alter the actual source code, such as Java code. This transforms the original source 
code into a lexically equivalent form by mangling names and scrambling identifiers. Such trans-
formations make it a daunting task to reverse engineer a program. A simple example would be 
to swap the names of the functions add () and subtract (). (This would also involve swapping 
every reference to these functions as well.) An even more interesting approach would to replace 
add() with the function tcart bus() and replace subtract() with the function sunim (). 
Control transformations alter the control flow of the program by changing branch targets to 
an ambiguous state. The code for the program is shuffled such that the original branch targets 
are no longer correct. During this shuffling, the new targets are calculated, and code is inserted 
in place of the old branch instruction to acquire its new target address. 
Data transformations rearrange data structures such that they are not contiguous. Data can 
be transformed all the way down to the bit level. Bit interleaving is one example. 
One particular obfuscation technique of interest is obscuring control flow of a program. By 
obscuring branch target addresses, static analysis of a control flow graph can be shown to be 
NP-hard [12]. Program address based obfuscation is presented in [7]. 
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2.3 Hashing functions 
Hashing functions scan sections of the program, and use the data contained therein as input 
to a mathematical equation. The simplest of which would be to sum all the numbers in a given 
section. When done, the answer must agree with the previously determined result. If they are 
not the same, this section of the program has been altered. 
It is fairly obvious that such a scheme is easily broken, which has led to more complex 
techniques. Some techniques may use values on the stack at a crucial instant in time, or values 
in a register. Others perform complex mathematical equations on overlapping sections of code. 
Horne et al. [5] have implemented such a system, using linear hash functions, which overlap 
and also hash the hashing functions as well. One of the strong points of hashing is that you can 
have as many hashing functions as you want, all performing a different type of hash. 
2.4 Control Flow Monitoring 
Control flow monitoring involves tracing the execution of a program as it is running. A 
program is broken down into basic blocks using a Control Flow Graph (CFG) representation. 
Code is inserted into each of the basic blocks in order to keep a trace of the running application. 
At certain intervals, the trace is checked against a known good trace which is determined at 
compile time. This particular approach will be covered in much more detail in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. 
2.5 Types of Attacks 
When one decides to prevent attacks on their software, they must first decide what type 
of attack is of most concern to them. The following shows attacks classified into three basic 
categories. The main distinction being that each of these depend on the relative location of the 
origination of the attack. 
Outside attackers attempting to gain entry over a networked connection. This is 
the most common type of attack today, and several preventive measures are already 
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in place. 
11 Executable code that is run on a target system, but not under the direct control 
of the attacker, such as viruses and Trojan horses. This is a fairly common attack 
which has several preventive measures already in place as well. 
iii God Mode attacks: The attacker owns a copy of the software, and has complete 
control over the system it is run on. This is one of most damaging attacks in that it 
allows the theft of Intellectual Property, and the execution of pirated software. 
The God Mode attack model assumes that the attacker has full control over the system, i.e., 
the attacker owns the system the program is running on, and has total access to the software 
and hardware in the system. The attacker may choose to run binary analysis tools, software 
and hardware debuggers, logic analyzers, etc.. The main hurdle for the attacker is rooted in the 
amount of technical know-how he/she possess. These type of attacks are the focus of this paper. 
2.6 Control Flow Graph Overview 
A control flow graph (CFG) is an abstract data structure, which encompasses the procedural 
flow of a program. Each node in a CFG corresponds to a basic block, which is a maximal sequence 
of instructions with exactly one entry and one exit. A jump target constitutes the beginning of 
a basic block, while a jump instruction signifies the end of a block. 
There are two special basic blocks that every program must have, the entry block and the 
exit block. The entry block is the location where control enters the program, and the exit block 
it where control exits the program. 
The CFG is a static representation of a program, and covers the program in its entirety. 
Compilers use this data structure for several optimization passes, one such example being de-
tecting dead code. Dead code is easily detected by examining the entries into basic blocks. If a 
block has no entry, then it will never be executed. 
Each basic block has at most two successors, and at least one predecessor (except for the 
entry block for a program which has no predecessor). At a high level, basic blocks are most 
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commonly created from conditional statements such as if then else statements. The if block is 
the first successor ,and the else block is the second successor. 
Figure 2.1 shows a simple example of how an if then else statement is decomposed into basic 
blocks. One must keep in mind though, that the CFG a compiler maintains does not refer to 
high level code, instead it more closely resembles low level code, such as assembly. 
if(x == 1) 
y = y + 1; 
else 
y = y - 1; 
y = y + 1; 
Successor 1 
Predecessor 
if(x == 1) 
y = y - 1; 
Successor 2 
Figure 2.1 Example C source code and its corresponding CFG 
Figure 2.2 shows how the previous if then else statement is decomposed into its corresponding 
assembly. 
movl $0, -4(%ebp) 
~ movl $0, -8(%ebp) if(x == 1) Control cm pl $1, -4(%ebp) 
Transfer -jne .L3 
Instruction leal -8(%ebp), %eax r- y++ incl (%eax) 
Jmp .L4 
.L3: 
leal -8(%ebp), %eax 
~ de cl (%eax) y--
Figure 2.2 Example assembly code 
When the source code is compiled, the compiler translates the source into an intermediary 
representation called the Register Transfer Language (RTL). GCC maintains a representation 
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of the CFG for a program based on its RTL. It would be of little use to have the CFG refer to 
C level source code, due to its higher level of abstraction. RTL code is very similar to assembly 
code. In fact, the RTL is used directly to generate the assembly code, which is then used by the 
assembler to generate object or executable files. 
When the source code is in the RTL representation, the CFG is readily available to the 
compiler. 1 The CFG is used by several other optimization passes internal to GCC, and is 
updated accordingly after each pass. When GCC is ready to output the assembly code for the 
program, the CFG is in its final state. This is where the tamper resistant code is inserted. 
By exploiting the fact that the CFG represents every possible path within a program, one 
can detect tampering of the software, with a high degree of certainty. By monitoring the control 
flow of a program, one can determine if it has been altered in any way, by simply comparing it 
to the CFG that was obtained when the program was compiled. If at any time, a path is taken 
that is not accounted for in the CFG, the program had to be altered in order to do so. This 
type of alteration could be accomplished by using one of many different binary editing tools 
available. 
Take for example, a single function that checks to see if a license file is present, and valid. 
This function will have an entry and exit point associated with it. It is conceivable that an 
adversary could edit the instructions (at the binary level) of the entry block, such that it simply 
returns a positive outcome, such as a successful return code. Thus skipping the entire check all 
together! 
By monitoring the control flow of the program, such an occurrence could be detected by 
evaluating the flow to the CFG. In the previous example, the license check could be part of the 
program's initialization function. All of the possible paths through this function are contained 
in the CFG. By checking all the possible paths that lead up to, and away from the license check 
section, one can check if the program was altered in some way to skip over the check. 
Facilitating such a process involves inserting a separate instruction stream, which performs 
the monitoring of the program. Our architecture calls for a two process model in which the 
1GCC has incorporated a CFG library into versions greater then gcc3.0. Other compilers have similar support 
such as SUIF2 from Stanford. 
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application (P-Process) communicates its control flow to a monitoring process (M-Process). 
In order to enable the P-Process to communicate with the M-Process, code is inserted at the 
beginning of each basic block. This code's purpose is to inform the M-Process of the unique ID 
assigned to this block. The M-Process will gather the trace information for basic blocks, and 
check them against the known CFG representation, that was determined at compile time. When 
it finds a control flow sequence that is invalid, it knows that the M-Process has been tampered 
with in some way. At this point, appropriate actions can be taken to secure the application from 
an attacker. Such actions can range from printing a warning message, to completely deleting 
the file from the disk. The action taken is application specific, which allows different penalties 
for tampering with a given program. 
The CFG obtained from the compiler is a static representation of the flow of the program. 
Static analysis of the CFG is of much concern due to an attack's ability to automate a reverse 
engineering attack on the control flow. It is conceivable that someone could disassemble the 
program and recreate the CFG from the assembly code. This would allow an attack to succeed 
by communicating the fake set of unique identifiers associated with the original control flow 
graph instead of the new basic blocks inserted. This will allow the tampering to go undetected. 
In order to prevent such an attack, the unique identifiers of each basic block must be dynam-
ically determined at run-time uniquely for each run. Before the M-Process starts the P-Process, 
it will change the unique identifier associated with each basic block by replacing the value used 
by each basic block in its communication phase. The M-Process will also update its local CFG 
table with the new value. 
To further protect the CFG table, the M-Process will remain in a mostly encrypted form 
during its execution. The M-Process will use Integrity Verification Kernels (IVK) variant [1] to 
allow only a small portion of the M-Process to be in plain text at any given time. This protects 
the CFG data structure from static analysis. As pointed out previously, static analysis will only 
give an abstract representation of the CFG. The actual unique identifiers that make up the CFG 
will be different with each run. 
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2. 7 Monitor Process Overview 
The M-Process is an application specific process that comes paired with the actual executable 
for the P-Process. Its main responsibility is to monitor the flow of the P-Process, and detect if 
any tampering has been performed. Consequently, such a process should be stealthy, compact, 
and efficient. 
In addition to monitoring the P-Process, the M-Process is responsible for a myriad of other 
tasks such as starting the P-Process. When the M-Process starts up, it first performs some fix 
up tasks on the P-Process2 . It then execs3 the P-Process which allows it to start. 
Once the P-Process is running, for every basic block in the P-Process, a unique identifier will 
be sent to the M-Process. The M-Process will then verify the correct execution of the program 
by comparing it to the CFG that was determined at the compile time. The CFG data structure 
can be seen as a simple array containing 3-tuples of (Parent, Child1, Child2) entries for the 
entire CFG. 
The M-Process will initially be in an encrypted form, using standard encryption methods. An 
IVK is decrypted, and allowed to execute, one at a time. When any portion of the executable 
code or the data section is needed, it is modified from its encrypted form to its plain text, 
decrypted form, which is then executed or read as data [1]. 
Having the M-Process stored as an encrypted file buys a significant advantage over a plain 
text M-process scheme. Not only will the CFG data structure be protected from static analysis, 
but several parts of the P-Process will reside as data structures in the M-Process as well.4 This 
is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.4.5 and Chapter3.4.6. 
2The P-Process is not in a run-able state until the M-Process restores several parts of its executable code. 
3 exec refers to anything similar to the execv() call in Linux/Unix. 
4 Before the P-Process is paired to the M-Process, several parts of the P-Process are stripped out, and corre-
sponding data structures are inserted into the M-Process. For example, the entire main() routine. 
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CHAPTER 3. A CONTROL FLOW MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Application Transformation 
The application, or P-Process, must be transformed such that a new P-Process, P' is created 
with the same black box functionality as the original process P. This means that any changes 
made to the P-Process must be transparent to the user. The main goal is to create a tamper 
resistant version of P that is protected without any interaction from or inconvenience to the 
user. 
3.1.1 Instruction Insertion 
Instructions must be inserted into each basic block in order to communicate trace information 
to the M-Process. For example, consider a simple if then else statement as shown in Figure 3.1. 
if(x == 1) 
y = y + 1; 
else 
y=y-1; 
Figure 3.1 Example C source code 
First decompose it into its basic blocks at the assembly level. 1 Figure 3.2 shows BBO, BBl, 
and BB2 which refer to the three basic blocks that comprise the simple if statement in Figure 3.1. 
Notice the labels that start with the prefix ATP that correspond to the beginning of each basic 
block. The number in each label corresponds to its unique identifier. 
1 All assembly given uses the x86 instruction set. All assembly is created using GCC3.2.3. 
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Next these labels are replaced with instructions to communicate the block's identifier to the 
M-Process. Figure 3.3 shows the inserted instructions for each of the steps outlined below. 
l. Setup the stack pointer. 
2. Push the unique identifier onto the call stack. 
3. Call a function to write to the unique identifier to the pipe that the M-Process is listening 
on.2 
4. Restore the stack pointer for the current function. 
3.1.2 Communication 
At this point, each basic block in the P-Process has the extra instructions to communicate its 
basic block identifier to the M-Process. In a perfect world, this would be all that is needed, but 
such an implementation is not feasible. In order to implement this functionality, the P-Process 
must also tell the M-Process when it should verify the current trace that it is keeping. This can 
be done by transmitting a magic number, i.e. the VERIFY code. 
The key to making this work, is in determining where to insert the VERIFY code transmis-
sion to the M-Process. Inserting the VERIFY too often will yield very short traces, which will 
expose VERIFY boundaries in which an adversary would insert code. Limiting these boundaries 
will have a significant effect on how robust our mechanism is. In the worst case, a VERIFY 
could be inserted into every basic block, thus nullifying the trace mechanism all together! Also, 
a short period between the verification also leads to large overhead. 
On the other hand, due to compiler limitations, function boundaries pose a problem for long 
trace lengths. The CFG library in GCC does not allow basic blocks to be broken based on a 
function call. This is understandable because, in the worst case, the function call could be in 
a library. If the function is in a library, then it is impossible to have a usable successor for the 
block. On top of this, because of the way GCC works, it is also very complicated to have a 
2 A separate source file was used to implement the P-Process communication. This file is compiled to an object 
file, and linked with the P-Process. 
16 
.ATP_270: 
: movl $6; ~4(%cbp) 
:movl $0, -8(%ebp) 




:lea! -8(%ebp), o/oeax 
BB 1 --~•-':incl (o/oeax) 
:jrnp ... p . 
. L6: 
.ATP_272: 
BB2 --~•-o:leal -8(%ebp), %eax 
: decl (%eax) 
Figure 3.2 Assembly output with ATP labels 
.ATP_270: 
I --- sub! $12, %esp 
2 --- push! $270 
3--- caJI _AT_write_mp_pipe 
4--- addl $16, %esp 
movl $0, -4(%ebp) 
movl $0, -8(%ebp) 
cmpl $1, -4(%ebp) 
jne .L6 
.ATP_271: 
1--- sub! $12, %esp 
2--- push! $271 
3--- call _AT_write_mp_pipe 
4--- addl $16, %esp 





1--- subl $12, %esp 
2--- push! $272 
3--- call _AT_write_mp_pipe 
4--- addl $16, %esp 
lea! -8(%ebp), %eax 
decl (%eax) 
Figure 3.3 Modified assembly code with communication instructions m-
serted 
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successor that is in another file or even in another function. GCC processes one function at a 
time, when it performs its passes. In other words, the CFG is only maintained per function, 
and not globally. 
From an implementation standpoint, there are several levels of abstraction that one may 
decide to insert the VERIFY codes. Inserting the VERIFY at the RTL level has several ad-
vantages, such as portability. It also lends itself to allowing the compiler to generate efficient 
assembly code. The main disadvantage to this approach is the complexity of its implementation. 
A much easier approach is to insert instructions directly into the assembly code for a program. 
The assembly level approach is the one that we are using currently. 
Now, we need to decide when and where to insert the VERIFY codes. It is fairly easy to 
place the VERIFY code transmission at the end of every function. Through the use of temporary 
files, global CFG information is be maintained for each function's entry block identifier. At the 
assembly level, this is done by parsing the assembly instructions to determine the callee for each 
function call. Once a call instruction is seen, the global CFG data file is scanned to determine 
the entry block for the callee, and the successors for the current block (in which the call is 
contained) are updated to point to the entry block of the called function. 
3.2 Monitor Process 
The Monitor Process (M-Process) resides along side the P-Process. It's purpose is to monitor 
the control flow of the P-Process, and take appropriate actions when an inconsistency is found. 
The M-Process structure is shown in Figure 3.4. The following sections describe each of the 
components for the M-Process. 
3.2.1 Communication 
In order for the M-Process to receive identifiers from the P-Process, it must have a commu-
nication port of some sort. At the software level, this is implemented as a Unix pipe, in which 
the M-Process listens on. The M-Process will sit and wait for any identifiers that are sent from 
the P-Process. As the identifiers are received, they are collected in a trace buffer for further 
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Figure 3.4 M-Process 
use by the verification engine. Typically, the M-Process will wait for a VERJFY code from the 
P-Process before it invokes the verification engine. But, due to a fixed trace buffer size, a full 
buffer will force a check as well. A common situation that would fill up the buffer before a 
VERIFY code arrives, is a for loop that iterates many times. 
Figure 3.5 shows the communication from the P-Process to the M-Process. This uses the 
simple if then else statement shown in Figure 3.1. The path that is shown is the flow that would 
be seen if the if statement evaluated to true (1). 
3.2.2 Control Flow Graph Representation 
Let V be the set of nodes, and E be the set of edges in V x V that connect the nodes in V. 
Let C be the CFG of a program such that the set C = {V, E}, where V = { v1, v2, ... vk}. Each 
Vi is a node of the CFG, and each ei,j is an edge that represents a control transfer from Vi to Vj· 
Next define succ(vi) to be the set of nodes that are successors of Vi, and pred(vi) to be the 
set of nodes that are predecessors of Vi· A node Vi belongs to succ( Vj) if and only if ei,j exists. 
Similarly, a node Vj belongs to pred(vi) if and only if ej,i exists [4]. 
As the P-Process is compiled, a CFG is created. This CFG consists of 3-tuples in the form 
of {Pi,Sli,S2i}, where Pi is the current basic block's identifier, and Sli and S2i are the two 




sub! $12, %esp Trace Buffer 
push! $270 
127012711 I I I I I I call _AT_write_mp_pipe -
add! $16, %esp • 1 
movl $0, -4(%ebp) 
movl $0, -8(%ebp) .. ..... " . 
cm pl $1, -4(%ebp) Comm Port 
jne .L6 ID:270 
.ATP_271: : --·- .. •' 
sub! $12, %esp :. 
push! $271 ID: 271 
call _AT_ write_mp_pipe 
add! $16, %esp 





subl $12, %esp 
push! $272 
call _AT_write_mp_pipe 
addl $16, %esp 
lea! -8(%ebp), %eax 
de cl (%eax) 
Figure 3.5 P-Process to M-Process communication example. 
most two successor edges. Each ei corresponds to an edge from node Pi to one if its successors. 
By evaluating the edges, Sli and S2i are calculated. This can be done simply by using ei,1 to 
determine Sli and ei,2 to determine S2i· 
This information is kept in a linear array, which can be searched based on these 3-tuples. 
This is the simplistic description. Many enhancements such as sorting, caching, and dynamic 
identifiers help serve to increase performance further, and to better secure the CFG data struc-
ture. 
3.2.3 Verification 
Conceptually, during execution of the program, if any ei,j exist that are not part of C, then 
an illegal control flow has been seen. Verification of a trace of identifiers involves sequentially 
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scanning the trace buffer and comparing it to the CFG. To do this, let Pi equal the current 
identifier in the trace buffer, and let Pi+l be the next identifier in the trace. Scan the CFG table 
until a tuple containing Pi as {Pi,Sli,S2i} is found. The following two entries Sli and S2i are 
the two successors of this basic block in a legitimate control flow. Each entry Pi is tested such 
that Pi+l must equal either Sil or Si2. If this test fails, an incorrect path has been taken in the 
program, indicating that the program has been tampered with. 
Figure 3.6 shows some simple pseudo code used to verify the trace buffer. It should be noted, 
that the last entry in the trace buffer is never used for a parent identifier. Its only purpose is 
to be used as a successor identifier. This is because it is the last entry, and subsequently has no 
successor in the trace buffer to test. 
for i = 0 to number of entries in trace-buffer - 1 
let P = trace_buffer[i] 
search CFG table for tuple {P,Sl, S2} using Pas key 
let succl = S 1 and succ2 = S2 
test: trace_buffer[i + l] == Sl? OR trace_buffer[i + 1] == S2? 
if test fails, GOTO FAIL 
continue 
Figure 3.6 Verification pseudo code. 
3.2.4 Protection Scheme (Aucsmith's IVKs) 
Aucsmith[l] proposed a very interesting tamper resistant scheme. This scheme however has 
very high overhead. A simplified version of this scheme is presented in the following. For a 
detailed treatment of an implementation of this scheme, the reader is referred to [3]. 
Each text section is broken down into several text subsections. The objective is that at 
any point in time, exactly one text subsection is in plaintext (the one that is currently exe-
cuting). Whenever, there is a control flow edge between two such text subsections, the target 
text subsection is decrypted into plaintext alongwith encryption of the source text subsection 
simultaneously. Figure 3.8 illustrates a program (text section) broken into 8 text sub sections 
CFGTable 
0 I 2 
I 0 3 
2 3 8 
3 4 8 
4 5 6 
5 7 8 
6 7 8 
7 8 -I 




P1 =0, S11=1, Si2=2 
P2 = 1 
Iteration 2: 
P2 = 1, Sil = 0, Si2 = 3 
P3=0 
Iteration 3: 
P3 =0, S.,1=1, S.,2 = 2 
P4 =2 
Figure 3.7 M-Process Verification Example 
and the induced control flow graph at the text subsection granularity. Note that there can be 
multiple control flow edges between two subsections as in T6 and T1. There can be backward 
control flow edges as from T5 to T2. 
Initially, all the text subsections T1 through T1 are in memory in some encrypted form (to 
be described later). Only the entry subsection To is in plaintext. Let us say that the first inter-
text-subsection control flow edge to be instantiated is from To to T3. The following actions are 
taken at that point. 
Transfer control to a "decrypt & jump" module (similar to Aucsmith's) with a key as an 
argument. The key for the control flow edge from To to T3 is denoted by Ko,3· The decrypt 
& jump action XORs the key K 0 ,3 with each subsection. If the text subsections were assigned 
appropriate initial states, exactly one of the subsections would appear in plaintext. In this 
case, the text subsection T3 must have been initialized to T3 EB Ko,3, which would result in T3 
decrypting into plaintext from XOR with K 0,3 . Each text subsection can either have a magic 
number or a special nop instruction (or some null instruction such as jump to next location) 
embedded at the beginning. The decrypt & jump function can check for that special instruction 
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K0,3 
Tl TO T4 TS T2 T3 T6 T7 
K3,4 
Figure 3.8 Text Subsection Layout 
or magic number at the beginning of each text subsection. The text subsection with the special 
entry attribute is the one the control is transferred to. Note that a branch/jump instruction from 
To only needed to specify the key Ko,3 to specify its target (and an offset from the beginning of 
the target text subsection T3 to the actual branch target). 
The assumption is that each text subsection is designed to be the same size (it need not be 
as it depends on the key size). Maximum obfuscation is obtained if the key is as large as the 
text subsections (TS bytes). However, then the keys are large. The keys could be chosen in 
other granularities as well such as word size (4B) or cache block size (say 16B) or anything else 
up to TS. This is a tradeoff in memory overhead to maintain the keys versus obfuscation. If 
the key is chosen to be cache block size, then each cache block sized chunk in a text subsection 
is XORed with the key. 
Key Consistency: Consider the text subsection T4. It could either be reached from 
To through T3 (path ToT3T4) or with path ToT1T2T4. How should we initially encrypt the 
subsection T4? If we make it consistent with the path T0T3T4 then the initial state ought to 
be T4 E9 Ko,3 E9 K3,4· Then the control flow edge from T0 to T3 would have XORed the initial 
T4 E9 Ko,3 E9 K3,4 with Ko,3, and the control flow edge from T3 to T4 would have XORed the 
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resulting T4 E9 K3,4 with K3,4 exposing T4 as desired. But the path ToT1T2T4 requires an initial 
encoding of T4 E9 Ko,1 E9 Kl,2 E9 K2,4· Which one should it be? In general, many more paths could 
have led from the root node to this node placing many more constraints on the initial encoding. 
Can we always find consistent set of keys to satisfy all these constraints? 
It turns out that the only constraint the keys need to satisfy is that if keys Ki 1 , Ki2 , ••• , Kik 
label the control flow edges along a cycle (undirected induced) then Ki1 E9 Ki2 E9 ... E9 Kik must 
be O! Note that E9 signifies bit-wise XOR of its arguments. By this token, in the example above, 
Ko,3 E9 K3,4 E9 K2,4 E9 Kl,2 E9 Ko,1 = 0 since To, T3, T4, T2, Tl, To form a cycle. This would imply 
that Ko,3 E9 K3,4 = K2,4 E9 Kl,2 E9 Ko,1 and hence these keys can be assigned consistently. 
The general strategy would be to choose all the keys but one in a cycle randomly inde-
pendently. The one key would have to be derived from all the other keys through the cycle 
constraint. 
Text Subsection Partitioning: One of the objectives of the text section partitioning 
into text subsections could be to minimize the number of cross-subsection control flow edges. 
This is since each instantiated control flow edge costs a decrypt & jump operation. Hence, 
a k-mincut of the control flow graph of a text section into k text subsections of more or less 
equal size (with a constraint on the upper bound on this size) is the optimization objective. If 
profiling information is also available annotating the control flow edges with the probability of 
instantiation, the mincut gives us an even better partition. An approach based on Kernighan-Lin 
mincut heuristic [8] will provide a reasonable cell partitioning. 
3.3 Utility Applications 
After gee has processed the source code, and inserted the corresponding labels, several util-
ities are used to insert the anti-tamper instructions directly into the assembly output. The 
following sections will describe each of the utilities, and detail the service each performs. 
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3.3.1 Function Boundaries 
When the source is compiled, gee maintains nothing with respect to function call boundaries. 
Technically speaking, a function call constitutes a control transfer, but the CFG library provided 
with gee does not take this into account. This causes problems when performing predicate 
verification. 
In order to correctly verify predicates, as they cross function boundaries, fixpredtable is 
used to parse the assembly, detecting function calls. When a function call is seen inside a basic 
block, the successor for the basic block is updated to contain the unique identifier of the entry 
block to the function that is being called. 
It is worth noting that this is an advanced option of the anti-tamper suite, and need not be 
used, unless so desired. If such a mechanism is not needed, one only needs to simply place a 
VERIFY code transmission at the beginning of each function. 
3.3.2 Instruction Insertion 
The assembly output from gee will contain labels signifying the beginning of each basic block. 
These labels determine where to insert the communication instruction sequence for each basic 
block. An example can be seen in Figure 3.3. addmpcalls will parse the assembly output and 
add the correct instruction sequence after each corresponding ATP label. 
3.3.3 Dynamic Branch Targets 
Certain programming scenarios require the use of callback functions. Such functions are 
usually passed to another function as a pointer to a function, such that the function may 
ambiguously call a function to perform a task. A classic example is found when processing 
widgets in a graphical user interface environment. One can create a button and associate a 
callback function with the button, which will perform the appropriate task when the button is 
pressed. 
Such functions pose a problem when determining trace information for a program. Because 
the callback function is assigned dynamically, it is impossible to determine at compile time which 
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function will actually be called with 1003 accuracy. 
The utility fixbadjumps searches the assembly code for such instances of jumps to callback 
functions. When it sees such an event take place, it inserts a VERJFY code communication 
sequence before the jump instruction. This allows the M-Process to validate the current trace, 
and proceed normally when control enters the callback function. 
3.3.4 Instruction Removal 
The main function of the P-Process is stripped out, rendering the application unusable in 
its raw state. stripappmain performs this task by using the symbol table to locate the main 
function. Once it finds main, it replaces it with all zeros, and creates a data structure to be 
placed into the M-Process. 
3.3.5 CFG Template Insertion 
When the P-Process is compiled, a temporary data file is created, which contains the CFG. 
This CFG is merely a template which is used to map the dynamic identifiers to their original 
ones. addpredtable will insert this template into the M-Process as a data structure, which the 
M-Process will use at runtime. 
3.3.6 Instruction Hiding 
addbinimg will strip out several key parts of the P-Process, and put them into the M-
Process as data structures. This is discussed in detail in Section 3.4.5 and Section 3.4.6. 
3.3. 7 Runtime CFG Table Storage 
In order for the M-Process to dynamically assign unique identifiers a place holder is used 
for this data structure. It is felt that this is more secure than simply using malloc because this 
data structure can be protected using encrypting methods via Aucsmith's scheme. If memory is 
simply allocated using malloc or some similar memory allocation function, the real CFG would 
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be visible in memory to the adversary. addcfgtable will create an array, with all zeros, the size 
of the CFG table, which will be filled in at runtime. 
3.3.8 File Size Check 
In order to combat attacks that may add code to the P-Process, the file size is recorded. 
addfilesize will place the correct file size into the M-Process, so the M-Process can check the 
actual file size against the compiled file size. This is a very simple, yet effective, countermea.sure 
which will keep the adversary from inserting fix-up ta.sks to fool the M-Process. 
3.4 Implementation 
Conceptually, CFG monitoring is a fairly straight forward idea. Simply analyze a program 
at compile time, save that information, and compare it against the runtime flow of the pro-
gram. But, from an implementation standpoint, things are not quite as ea.sy. Issues such a.s 
performance, static analysis, and code stability all lend to a complicated implementation. The 
following sections will discuss these issues in more detail. 
3.4.1 CFG Performance Enhancements 
The CFG data structure is typically a large entity. Ba.sics blocks are usually quite small, on 
average 10 instructions or so. This means that searching the CFG can become a costly task to 
perform. In the worst case, the identifier could be the last entry in the table, therefore requiring 
the search to look at every entry in the table. For large tables, a significant performance hit wa.s 
observed. 
One method to help speed up the CFG table search is to implement a caching mechanism. 
The cache would contain the la.st N 3-tuples which correspond to the la.st N identifiers seen, 
where N is the number of entries the cache can hold. The cache is implemented as a simple 
FIFO buffer, which holds a trace window for the most recent identifiers that the M-Process ha.s 
seen. The M-Process will first check the cache to see if an entry is already there. Only if it is not 
found, will it perform a search on the full CFG. Due to locality of reference inherent in software 
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programs, this improvement increases performance greatly. For ease of implementation, and 
more notably speed, duplicate entries in the cache are allowed. 
Another method to speed up this operation is to sort the CFG table based on increasing P 
values, and perform a binary search. This method yields a search time of 0 (log N), where N 
is the number of basic blocks. Because this yields a vast improvement, the cache size can be 
reduced considerably. Earlier, when there were thousands of entries in the CFG table, a fairly 
large cache yielded good performance gains. However, with binary search, cache sizes larger 
than 32 entries actually yielded poorer performance. 
3.4.2 System Library Flaws 
A possible security hole is in the fact that the M-Process uses system libraries to perform 
several tasks. The most common of these is the pipe interface of glibc. Recall that the attacker 
has full control of the operating environment. Which means, in Linux, they have full access 
to the source code. To combat such attacks, it is recommended that proprietary interfaces be 
written for system library functionality. Pipes and random number generation are the most 
vulnerable to such attacks. 
Not only are system libraries a security threat, they also pose performance problems. When 
an application makes a system call, there is significant overhead that the kernel must handle. 
First, the call is now in system space, invoking the kernel for assistance. This means that the 
application must wait for the kernel thread to execute, in order to perform the operation. In 
the case of reading or writing to a pipe, the kernel must also keep track of which pipes are open, 
which process is allowed to read/write to a pipe, and memory management. 
Initially it was found that sending the unique identifiers to the pipes at every basic block 
was significantly slow. To help reduce the performance loss due to system calls, an internal 
buffer is used. This buffer is used to hold a number of identifiers. Once it has queued up to its 
limit, it will send them all in one chunk to the M-Process. In much the same fashion, the M-
Process will request as many identifiers as its buffer size. The read() system call under Linux, 
is implemented as a "blocking read", meaning that when a process calls the read() function, it 
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will be put to sleep until the number of bytes that it requested have arrived. 
3.4.3 Dynamic Identifiers and the CFG Template 
A dynamic identifier is a basic block identifier that changes with each run of the program. 
The driving force behind a dynamic approach is to thwart static analysis of the program. In 
order to break the tamper resistant measures in place, one would only need the CFG for the 
program. Once they have the CFG, any changes to the flow of the code can be patched up 
appropriately with the correct values from the CFG. This causes much concern, because of the 
static nature of the CFG. In other words, the adversary needs to only figure this out once, and 
it will remain true for the entire lifetime of the application (or at least one version of it). 
In order to take this into account, the CFG that is calculated at compile time is used merely 
as a template. This template will serve as the road map for the identifiers that are placed 
at runtime. For example, take the identifier ATP_270 from Figure 3.3. The CFG that was 
determined at compile time will have references to identifier 270. One tuple will have 270 as the 
predecessor, and any number of tuples may contain 270 as a successor of another block. 
At runtime, the M-Process will access each basic block in the P-Process and update the 
instruction sequence accordingly to insert the new identifier. Then the template is used to map 
the new unique identifiers creating a new CFG inside the M-Process, which holds the actual 
values in use. Use of a static algorithm is not recommended to create the unique identifiers at 
runtime. Using an algorithm to change the unique identifiers is also static in nature, and easily 
attackable. For our purposes, the use of the system library function rand() was employed. 
3.4.4 M and P Process Coupling 
A unique complementary M-Process is created for each P-Process in much the same way 
pieces of a puzzle fit together. In order to execute any P-Process, there is only one M-Process 
that has the required information to perform the task. Also, the P-Process is stripped down to 
a state that is not runnable on any architecture or tool. Several key pieces are missing, and it 
is the job of the M-Process to patch these missing pieces. 
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After the executable is created, several pieces are taken out, and inserted as data structures 
in the M-Process. This allows these key pieces to be guarded by the encryption methods used 
to guard the M-Process itself. 
First, the application's main function is stripped out. This puts the application in a state 
that is not runnable. The reason for this is that an adversary might be able to perform some 
analysis on the P-Process, if it is possible to get it to a runnable state which does not use the 
M-Process. This guarantees that running the P-Process by itself will cause a fatal error and it 
will be discarded by the operating system. 
When the P-Process is compiled, it is linked against a common set of code that implements 
the communication functionality with the M-Process. It is feasible that an attack may sterilize 
the communication by modifying these functions. In order to combat such a scenario, these 
functions are also stripped out, and placed into the M-Process. 
Another sanity check that the M-Process will do is to verify the file size of the P-Process. 
After the P-Process is compiled, the size of the final executable is known. This value is placed 
into the M-Process for later use. When the M-Process opens up the P-Process file, the first 
thing it does is to verify that the sizes match. This means that an adversary cannot insert extra 
code into the file in the form of attacks. To further enhance this mechanism, a checksum could 
also be calculated on the P-Process. Some care must be taken when computing the checksum, 
due to the fact that the P-Process goes through several transformations. 
3.4.5 Data Hiding 
When the P-Process is started by the M-Process, it needs to know how to communicate its 
unique identifiers. Namely, it needs the pipe identifier that the M-Process will be listening to. In 
order to facilitate this process, a placeholder is present in the P-Process' data section. Initially 
it contains some bogus value, which is of little concern. What is of concern is the flag variable 
in the P-Process data section that tells the P-Process that the pipe identifier has been updated 
to the current runtime value. There are several other flags of this nature that the M-Process 
30 
will change before the P-Process starts.3 
A possible attack scenario would involve editing the default values of some or all of these 
flags, consequently making the P-Process think that the M-Process has correctly patched it, and 
thus not catching the fact that it has been modified. Such an attack alone would not do much, 
but it could be a significant building block, when combined with other attack methods. 
Data Section Hiding is the process of stripping out the P-Process data section, and placing 
it inside the M-Process as a data structure. Also remember that the M-Process is protected 
using encryption techniques. This means that the real data section is only visible for a very 
short period of time, and depending on the size, may only be partially visible at any given time 
as well. When the M-Process is in the P-Process fix up phase, it will restore the data section 
and also modify any values or flags that the P-Process needs for communication. 
3.4.6 Instruction Hiding 
A common tamper mechanism is to modify key pieces of executable code to fake out the ap-
plication. One such attack would be to nullify the communication with the M-Process. Because 
of performance reasons, the communication is one-way. The P-Process only sends data, and the 
M-Process only processes the data it receives. To exploit this fact, one could simply place a 
return instruction as the first instruction in the function which performs the communication to 
the M-Process. The function would simply return, and the P-Process would continue running 
(as would the M-Process). To subvert such an attack, the ability to strip out executable code, 
and place it as data in the M-Process has been added. When the M-Process starts up, it must 
replace several key pieces of the P-Process such as pipe communication routines and the main 
routine. 
3.4. 7 Benefits of a Hardware Implementation 
The key hurdle in an actual implementation is the overall performance of the tamper resistant 
code. A purely software solution has shown itself to be rather inefficient, thus slowing things 









Figure 3.9 Microarchitecture to support M-Process 
down. While several enhancements have been made, such as caching, and reduction of system 
calls, the overall performance can be vastly improved if a hardware based approach is used. The 
details are beyond the scope of this document, but one can easily see that a hardware M-Process 
would have its advantages. The verification engine's performance would increase significantly, 
and the communication could be done with new instructions, also speeding things up. 
There are several advantages from a security standpoint as well. The inner workings of the 
M-Process could be further hidden "inside the chip". This would protect against buss snooping, 
and other hardware monitoring types of attacks. Note that the two processes P and M are 
fairly tightly coupled. Hence if a two instruction stream processor microarchitecture to allow 
for the synchronization between the two streams is available, the overhead of the P and M 
process interaction will go down significantly. Large part of the overhead is in the operating 
system based signaling. All of that would be replaced by hardwired signaling, which would be 
significantly cheaper. Such a processor microarchitecture for a branch decoupled processor [10] 
has been proposed and evaluated. Figure 3.9 shows the elements of such a microarchitecture. 
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The salient parts of this architecture are the synchronization queues P-to-M-Queue and M-to-P-
Queue. These queues can be destinations of any instructions to deposit either a synchronization 
token into this queue, and/or to share the value of a register. The two logical processors, P and 
M, have their own register files. They can also have their own instruction caches. 
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CHAPTER 4. PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
One of the main goals of our approach was to make it appear, from a user's perspective, as if 
nothing was any different. Because of the way we designed our architecture, it allowed the inner 
workings of our scheme to be transparent to the user, so the actual performance degradation 
observable to the user became a final hurdle. We found that the system call overhead was of 
much concern because of the large number of writes performed to the communication pipe. We 
also found that, when the CFG table gets to be significantly large, searching this can become 
time consuming as well. 
In order to account for these performance weaknesses, an identifier buffer and cache were 
implemented. The identifier buffer allows identifiers to be queued and sent all at once, incurring 
one system call, instead of and entire buffer's worth of system calls. The identifier cache allows 
the verification engine to quickly find recently used identifiers. Because of the locality ofreference 
of a large number of instructions, a cache is an effective way to avoid searching the entire CFG 
table. To further speed up CFG searching, a binary search was added. It was also found 
that because the cache search is a linear search, only a small cache is needed when used in 
conjunction with the CFG binary search. The following performance results will show how 
different enhancements to the overall architecture achieve significant performance gains. 
The following data shows performance results obtained with the Linux time function 1. The 
time function takes a program as its argument, and measures the program's execution time. It 
is only an approximation due to the inaccurate modeling of the system mechanism (interrupts) 
to schedule the measurement events. However, even these imprecise measurements suffice from 
a comparative point of view. The results are parametrized by the pipe buffer size, and the 
1Test system: 2.4Ghz Athlon, 512MB RAM, 266MHz system buss 
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cache size. The x-axis shows the overall time taken to complete the tests. The y-axis shows the 
parameter that was varied for each test. 
Figure 4.1 shows the execution time results for the well known compression utility, gzip. 
gzip-1.2.4 in particular was used. Figure 4.2 shows the results for a network simulator, which 
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Figure 4.1 Cache results using gzip on a 450kB file. 
As is evident, the performance without the buffered control trace verification and CFG 
caching enhancements is poor. The system time was significantly decreased by lowering the 
number of system calls (which were mostly needed for the pipe communication). A custom 
communication method, if correctly designed, could yield even better performance. The user 
execution time was decreased by implementing an identifier cache. The performance is improved 
even further by using a binary search with a sorted CFG table. 
These performance measures are based on applications which are computationally intensive 
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Figure 4.2 Buffer size results using gzip on a 450kB file. 
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it. In applications that have inherent sleep times, such as waiting for user I/O, semaphores, or 
network I/O, performance degradation is minimal. 
For example, Figure 4 shows a clone of a well known game, Breakout. It was used to test 
performance on the general class of user interaction programs. Figure 4 shows a screenshot of 
the game. This game is a good test of performance because of not only the user interaction, but 
also due to the fact that it needs CPU time consistently to display the constantly moving ball. 
Results showed no jitter in either the ball movement, or the paddle movement as a result of 
dynamic monitoring of the control flow. For such programs, the quality of the user interaction 
is the ultimate test of the acceptable performance overhead. It appears as if the proposed 
anti-tamper technique is more than acceptable for such programs. 
Similarly Figure 4 shows a simple calculator written for the Linux Gnome desktop envi-
ronment called Galculator, which uses the GTK graphics libraries. This type of application 
involves relatively little user interaction. Most of the time, the application is sleeping, waiting for 
input from the user. There was absolutely no user distinguishable difference in the performance 
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Figure 4.3 Cache results using mpcp...sim for a .1 second simulation. 
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Figure 4.5 Breakout screenshot. 
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Figure 4.6 Galculator screenshot. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a novel two-process based anti-tamper scheme, wherein a monitoring 
process monitors the control flow integrity of the monitored process constantly. We implemented 
such a scheme with gee which compiles into two such co-processes: one for monitoring and one 
for the original monitored program. We verified empirically that the performance overhead for 
user interaction dominated programs is not even observable. For the CPU dominated programs, 
the implementation can be performed at a variety of axes to trade anti-tamper degree with 
efficiency. We also propose a two-instruction stream processor microarchitecture to perform the 
same task with much higher efficiency and more stealth. 
Areas such as system libraries, hardware modules and verification triggering deserve further 
investigation. System libraries should be replaced with an anti-tamper version of the library. 
This would allow trace information to extend into library calls, thus protecting against library 
replacement, and/or tampering. Hardware modules would allow for further protection of the 
CFG table, and the M-Process. Verification is currently triggered at the end of a function, which 
creates a gap in which to insert tampering code. This is currently the obvious place to "hijack" 
the P-Process. Although, the task of doing so would require a significant effort due to file size 
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